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LABOR LAW-FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT-RECOVERY IN SUIT BY SECRETARY 
OF LABOR OF WAGES LosT THROUGH WRONGFUL DISCHARGE-Several em-
ployees of respondent had requested the Secretary of Labor to institute an 
action against the respondent under the Fair Labor Standards Act1 to 
recover unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation. As a result, 
the employees were discharged, in violation of section 15 (a) (3) of the act.2 
The Secretary brought an action under section 173 to enjoin respondents 
from the violation, for reinstatement and for wages lost due to the wrongful 
discharge. The court of appeals4 held that the district court had no jurisdic-
tion under section 17 to award wages lost through wrongful discharge. On 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed, three justices 
dissenting.11 The proviso in section 17 of the FLSA depriving the district 
courts of jurisdiction to award unpaid minimum wages or overtime com-
pensation in a suit by the Secretary of Labor to restrain violations of the 
act does not apply to wages lost by wrongful discharge. Mitchell v. Robert 
DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 80 S. Ct. 332 (1960). 
The Fair Labor Standards Act prohibits the discharge of an employee 
because he has taken action seeking enforcement of the minimum wage and 
152 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U .S.C. (1958) §201 et seq. 
2 52 Stat. 1068 (1938), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §215 (a)(3), making it unlawful for any em-
ployer within the scope of the act to "discharge ••• any employee because such employee 
has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or 
related to this Act .••. " 
s 52 Stat. 1069 (1938), as amended, 63 Stat. 919 (1949), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §217, granting 
district courts jurisdiction to restrain violations of §15, including §15 (a) (3), note 2 supra. 
4 (5th Cir. 1958) 260 F. (2d) 929. 
Ii Justices Whittaker, Black, and Clark, dissenting. 
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overtime compensation provisions of the act.6 To implement the enforce-
ment of this prohibition, the statute provides criminal sanctions7 and, in 
section 17,8 empowers the Secretary of Labor to enjoin its violation. No pro-
vision is made for the recovery of wages lost through wrongful discharge. 
Under the original act, however, in a section 17 injunction suit by the 
Administrator of the Wages and Hours Division,9 it was held in Walling v. 
O'Grady1 0 that district courts had jurisdiction to award wages lost due to 
wrongful discharge, and in McComb v. Scerbo11 that unpaid minimum 
wages and overtime compensation could be awarded. In 1949, due to the 
hesitancy of workers to bring suit under the act il'l their own right for fear 
of resulting discriminatory action by employers, Congress added section 
16 (c)12 authorizing the administrator, at the written request of an employee, 
to bring suit for deficiencies in minimum wages and overtime compensation 
required under sections 6'13 and 714 of the act. In view of the remedy pro-
vided by section 16 (c), a proviso was added to section 17 to deprive district 
courts of jurisdiction "in any action brought by the Secretary of Labor to 
restrain ... violations [of the act], to order the payment to employees of 
unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation. . . .''15 This 
proviso was to "have the effect of reversing such decisions as McComb v. 
Scerbo.''16 The principal case held that the O'Grady case, allowing re-
covery of wages lost through wrongful discharge in a section 17 suit, was not 
such a decision as McComb v. Scerbo, within the meaning of the proviso. 
The soundness of this decision seems to be assured by a comparison of the 
facts in each case in relation to the respective remedies available under the 
act. The Scerbo case, wherein an injunction was sought by the Secretary 
against violations of the minimum wage and overtime compensation pro-
visions of the act, involved just such a situation as section 16 (c) was designed 
to remedy. Back minimum wages may also be recovered in an action by the 
employee in his own right.17 Thus allowing recovery of deficiencies in mini-
mum wages and overtime compensation in an injunction suit by the Secre-
tary would lead to a superfluity of remedies for that particular violation. 
But in the case of a wrongful discharge, such as in Walling v. O'Grady and 
6 See note 2 supra. 
7 Section 16 (a), 52 Stat. 1069 (1938), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §216 (a), provides for a fine or not 
more than $10,000, for the first willful violation of §15, and the same fine, imprisonment 
for not more than six months, or both, for subsequent willful violations. 
s See note 3 supra. 
9 Under the Reorganization Plan of 1950, Congress transferred the exclusive power to 
bring injunctions under §17 of the FLSA to the Secretary of Labor. 
10 (2d Cir. 1944) 146 F. (2d) 422. 
11 (2d Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 137. 
12 63 Stat. 919 (1949), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §216 (c). 
1352 Stat. 1062 (1938), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §206. 
14 52 Stat. 1063 (1938), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §207. 
15 See note 3 supra. 
16 H. R. 1453, 81st Cong., 1st sess., p. 32 (1949). 
17 Section 16 (b), 52 Stat. 1069 (1938), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §216 (b). 
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the principal case, the act fails expressly to provide any remedy. Nor can 
the discharged employee maintain a civil action for the lost wages.is 
Public interest in enforcing the FLSA dictates that employees within the 
scope of the act be enabled to recover wages lost through such retaliatory 
action by the employer. The danger of discharge and a resulting loss of in-
come for an indefinite period is often more than enough to deter an under-
paid employee from taking action to recover deficiencies in past wages. 
Since enforcement of the act is largely dependent upon the action of em-
ployees and upon information supplied by them,19 the inaction which 
would result from failure to restore discharged employees to the status quo 
could render the FLSA a virtual nullity. The injunction suit by the Secre-
tary under section l 7 seems the most reasonable vehicle for accomplishing 
the recovery. And the introduction of a case involving public policy in-
vokes full utilization of the traditionally broad and flexible character of an 
equity court's remedial powers.20 Since the enforcement of a statute is 
not limited to the remedies expressly provided therein,21 the scope of an 
equity court's jurisdiction in providing for such enforcement will be limited 
only by a clear expression of legislative intent.22 A district court may 
order payment of wages lost by an employee after his wrongful discharge 
has been enjoined.23 It is difficult to see why a judicial command should 
be more favorably enforced than that of a legislature, both being in further-
ance of the same policy. Failure of the employee to cause the institution of 
an immediate injunction would not seem to justify depriving him of a 
remedy for wages lost during the delay.24 
Robert Brooks 
18 Since the FI.SA makes no provision for a civil action by an employee to recover 
damages for discharge in violation of the act, redress for such action is by criminal pro• 
ceedings as provided by the act. Powell v. Washington Post Co., (D.C. Cir. 1959) 267 F. 
(2d) 651; Bonner v. Arden, (2d Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 703. But see Northwestern Yeast 
Co. v. Broutin, (6th Cir. 1943) 133 F. (2d) 628, holding that each provision of the FI.SA 
becomes a part of the employment contract of employees within the coverage of the act. 
19 In 1949, the Wages and Hours Division inspected less than 5% of the establishments 
covered by the act. S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare on S. 653, 81st Cong., 1st sess., p. 72 (1949). 
20 E.g., Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, Railway Employees Dept., A. F. 
of L., 300 U.S. 515 (1937). 
21 E.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941). 
22Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946). 
23 McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187 (1949). 
24 The dissent in the principal case stated that a wrongfully discharged employee is 
entitled to the same remedies as are provided for violation of the minimum wage and 
overtime compensation provisions of the act. While there seems to be no real reason to 
differentiate in the enforcement of the various provisions of the act, the language of the 
statute seems clearly to preclude such uniform means of enforcement. Section 16 (b), 
note 17 supra, gives an employee a right of action in his own name against "any employer 
who violates the provisions of section 6 or section 7 of the Act," which deal with minimum 
wages and overtime compensation. Section 16 (c), note 12 supra, authorizes the Secretary 
of Labor "to supervise the payment of unpaid minimum wages or the unpaid overtime 
compensation owing to any employees" under the same two sections, i.e., 6 and 7. 
